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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the capital nancing behavior of Chinese companies using data from 1,217 publicly
traded companies listed in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges covering the period of 1994 to
2006. The panel regression analysis indicates that the capital nancing behavior of Chinese rms deviates
substantially from the well-known pecking order theory. Specically, the results show that for Chinese
rms, equity issues are always the preferred nancing source over both retained earnings and debt issues in
meeting their funding requirements. The results also indicate that this attitude of favoring equity nancing is
a universal phenomenon among Chinese rms regardless of the di¤erence in their rm characteristics. Most
importantly, further analysis in the paper gives rise to a pattern of stylized asymmetric capital nancing
behavior equity issues are used much more frequently over debt issues under the condition of a fund ow
surplus versus that of a fund ow decit. This phenomenon could be the result of Chinese rms selecting
the degree of inherent equity-issue preference that is feasible to pursue given its fund ow condition.
Key Words: Capital Financing Choices (or Preference), Equity Financing, Financing Hierarchy, and
Pecking Order Theory
JEL Classication: G32
Corresponding author.
1 Introduction
The well-known pecking order theory developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests
that a rm has a preference ranking regarding its nancing sources. The theory argues that asymmetric
information between managers and investors gives rises to adverse selection costs, associated with a situation
whereby the rm passed up a valuable investment opportunity because it was faced with issuing undervalued
securities in order to nance it. The theory predicts that a rm uses nancing sources in reverse order of
information asymmetry to avoid adverse selection costs i.e., rms prefer internal to external nancing and
debt to equity if security issues are necessary.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) formulate a regression analysis to test the pecking order theory that
views the issuance of equity as a residual nancing source. They test the hypothesis that the nancial
decit (which occurs when the rms internal cash ow is inadequate for its real investment and dividend
commitments) should have an approximately dollar-to-dollar impact on rm leverage if the rm follows
the theory to always issue debt, but never equity, when the external nancing is necessary for investment
funding.1 They further note that the test can accommodate a reverse version of pecking order theory: the rm
would prefer to pay down debt but not repurchase equity when there is a nancial surplus.2 Shyam-Sunder
and Myers (1999) use the data from relatively large U.S. rms for the period of 1971 to 1989 to test the
hypothesis and conclude that the pecking order is an excellent rst-order descriptor of corporate nancing
behavior. However, several subsequent studies have found conicting results to challenge the pecking order
theory.
Frank and Goyal (2003) point out that a problem with sample selection (i.e., a relatively small sample
of large rms) might have led to a bias in Shyam-Sunder and Myersresults that support the pecking order
theory. In contrast, Frank and Goyal (2003) used a broad sample (of 768 rms) over the period of 1971 to
1998 to show that only the nancing behavior of the largest quartile rms in earlier years exhibited some
aspects of pecking order behavior, but that such behavior disappeared over time. Chirinko and Singha (2000)
caution that using the hypothesis test designed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers to evaluate plausible patterns
of external nancing can often generate misleading inferences. For example, they show that the regression
results fail to reject the pecking order hypothesis even when the rm did not follow the nancial hierarchy
of the pecking order theory (i.e., the rm issued equity before debt or it issued equity and debt in xed
proportions, assuming an optimal debt-equity ratio exists).
There is also research seeking support for the theory by testing the implications from the pecking order
theory against those from a competing capital structure theory, the static trade-o¤ theory.3 Fama and
French (2002) nd some support for the pecking order theory based on a negative association between rm
protability and leverage. However, they nd a negative association between equity issue and the level of
rm leverage, which also lends support for the trade-o¤ theory. Graham and Harvery (2001) survey the
Chief Financial O¢ cers of U.S. corporations about their nancial behavior. They conclude that, although
there is some support for both theories, the evidence in favor of these theories does not hold up well under
closer scrutiny.4 In particular, the evidence is largely inconsistent in regard to the pecking order theory,
with informational asymmetry causing the pecking-order-like nancing behavior. The consensus in the eld
has been that there is no conclusive test that can be used to evaluate whether the pecking order theory or
the trade-o¤ theory o¤ers a better explanation of a companys nancing behavior. The major di¢ culty is
that the two theories share many common variables when conducting an empirical analysis. Reecting this
consensus, Myers (2003) stated clearly that "there is no universal theory of capital structure and no reason
to expect one".
1They estimate a fund-ow-decit regression whose slope coe¢ cient gives information on the proportion nanced by debt
issued of a one dollar increase in nancial decits and the full support for the pecking order theory is the coe¢ cient being one.
2Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999, pp. 225) provide a general explanation as to why the pecking order theory should work
in reverse, while the associated theoretical reasoning can be derived based on Myers and Majluf (1984, pp. 207-209).
3See Harris and Raviv (1991) as a comprehensive survey paper that reviews the implications from both the pecking order
and the static trade-o¤ theories.
4The supportive evidence for the pecking order (trade-o¤) theory includes but not limited to that rms value nancial
exibility, and their equity issuance decision is a¤ected by equity undervaluation (rms target a range of debt ratio, and the
transactions costs a¤ect their debt policy).
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In most recent years, another set of studies have turned their focus on adding modications to the testing
framework of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) because they argue the pecking order hypothesis based on
Myers (1984) is oversimplied. Lemmon and Zender (2004) rene the empirical analyses by taking the
debt capacity constraints into consideration. They argue that a rm has rated debt outstanding does not
have debt capacity concerns constraining its nancial choices. Consequently, the nancial hierarchy of the
pecking order theory is more likely to be followed. Similarly, Jong, et al. (2009) incorporate the debt capacity
concerns in their regression analysis by separating the e¤ects of normal decits and large decits. Leary
and Roberts (2008) further show that the pecking orders predictive ability begin to increase when they
expand the empirical model to incorporate more factors, including cash reservoirs and debt capacity, which
are typically attributed to alternative theories.
It is worthy to note that the majority of empirical studies on capital structure theories use data from
industrial countries, mainly the U.S., including all of the literature that has been discussed thus far. On the
contrary, there are very few studies taking an interest in examining the capital structure behavior in develop-
ing countries.5 Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) study corporate nancing patterns in developing
countries and compare them with those in industrial countries. Both studies point out that corporations in
developing countries rely more heavily on issuing equity to nance growth than their counterparts in indus-
trial countries. Booth et al. (2001) provide evidence that capital structure choices in developing countries
are a¤ected by the same variables as in industrial countries, but there are important inter-country di¤erences
in how the debt ratios are a¤ected by country-specic factors, such as the development of capital markets.
Their ndings suggest that the corporate nancing patterns can be country specic.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether Chinese rms have a country-specic preference ranking
regarding their nancing sources, and what factors may contribute to the country-specic corporate nancing
patterns. We start our analysis with tests of nancing hierarchy from the pecking order theory as it is an
existing theory that gives prediction on a rms preference for nancing sources. We nd that the pecking
order theory is far from being a complete descriptor of Chinese corporate nancing behavior as the test
results show that: (1) debt issue is not an exclusive nance source when external nancing is needed for real
investment, and (2) a reverse version of pecking order theory does not work at all.
Next, in order to identify if there is any specic type of nancing hierarchy (other than the one proposed
by the pecking order theory) that exists among Chinese rms, it is natural to analyze how the three major
nancing sources retained earnings, debt, and equity are allocated to meet the funding requirement of a
rm growth. The results from the analysis demonstrate a stylized pattern of asymmetric capital nancing
behavior. Chinese rms prefer equity to both debt and retained earnings for funding growth, and the
preference is overwhelmingly stronger when facing a nancial surplus versus a nancial decit. Importantly,
we nd that this stylized nancial pattern is robust to the di¤erences in rm characteristics. It appears that
a rms nancial situation is an inuential factor that drives a Chinese rms decision regarding how much
it would pursue its given preference on equity issues over debt issues to meet a funding requirement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes sample data and provides descriptive
statistics on capital structure variables in both the full sample and subsamples based on di¤erent rm
characteristics. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology and reports associated test results for two
analyses: (1) the pecking orders nancing hierarchy, and (2) an asset growth regression that gives information
on the portion of a funding requirement that is met with each of major nancing sources. A stylized pattern
of asymmetric capital nancing behavior with the preference towards equity nancing emerges from these
testing results. Section 4 o¤ers a possible explanation as to why the rms nancial situation is an important
factor that contributes to the asymmetry in nancing behavior discovered in section 3. Section 5 summarizes
the conclusions.
5There are reasons to suspect that rms in developing countries may exhibit di¤erent nancing behavior than their coun-
terparts in industrial counties. For example, capital markets in developing countries are typically less developed and the
accounting/auditing standards are somewhat more relaxed than those in industrial countries. Therefore, rms in developing
countries can be expected to face di¤erent extent of constraints on their nancing decisions from their counterparts in industrial
counties.
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2 Sample Data and Preliminary Statistics
We use CCER database. The raw data contains 1,388 publicly traded companies (excluding nancial com-
panies) listed in both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges covering the period of 1994 to 2006. There
are 171 companiesdata showing some inconsistencies which include: 1. the (book) value of their long-term
investment is negative 2. the (book) value of their intangible assets is negative and 3. the (book) value
of their long-term liability is negative. After ltering these potentially problematic companies out of the
sample, we end up with a sample containing 1,217 companies. We use the maximum length of the data
available for each company in the analysis. The longest (shortest) length of the data we have for a company
is 12 years (1 year).
In the subsequent analysis, we categorize the full sample (consisting of 1,217 rms) into three equally-
divided subsamples based on three criteria- the level of rm size, rm growth, and rm leverage. The size of
a rm is measured by its mean value of total assets in all of the years included in the sample. The level of
rm growth is measured by the mean value of growth rate in total assets in all sample years. Also, the level
of leverage for a rm is calculated as its mean value of debt ratio, dened as total liabilities to the value of
total assets, in all sample years. Note that book value, instead of market value, of total assets is used to
compile all statistics in this paper.
Table 1 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the capital structures variables, including
retained earning ratio, debt ratio, equity ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio, for the full sample and the subsam-
ples.6 In the full sample, the mean debt ratio, equity ratio, and debt-to-equity ratios are 50.89%, 22.01%,
and 3.25, respectively. The results for the subsamples reveal several ndings that are worthy of further
analysis. First, both the equity and debt-to-equity ratios vary with respect to rm size. In particular, there
is a negative association between rm size and the equity ratio. Specically, the small-size rms have a
highest equity ratio of 30.10%, followed by medium-sized rms at 19.90%, and large-sized rms at 16.03%.
In addition, there is a positive association between rm size and the debt-to-equity ratio: the large-sized
rms have the highest debt-to-equity ratio at 4.52, followed by medium-sized rm at 3.05, and small-sized
rms at 2.17. These results indicate the relative importance of using debt versus equity as a nancing source
is higher in larger-sized rms. Second, similar to the nding for rm size, it is found that both the equity
and debt-to-equity ratios vary with respect to rm growth. The relation is negative for the equity ratio and
positive for the debt-to-equity ratio. The result suggests that the relative signicance of debt versus equity
to account for total assets is higher in rms with higher growth.7
To examine one of the papers main concerns - whether a rms fund ow condition inuences its capital
nancing choices between debt and equity, we compile the data of fund ow decit in the last column of Table
1.8 A clear negative (positive) association between equity (debt-to-equity) ratio and fund ow decit level
emerges, when results in both subsamples grouped by rm size and rm growth are compared. Using the
results in di¤erent rm size subsamples as an example, it can be seen that small-size rms have the smallest
fund ow decit level at -$5.35 (i.e., these rms have fund ow surplus) and their equity (debt-to-equity)
ratio is at the highest (lowest) level at 30.10% (2.17), while large-size rms have the largest fund ow decit
at $35.58 and the equity (debt-to-equity) ratio is at the lowest (highest) level at 16.03% (4.52). Further,
medium-size rms have fund ow decit of $23.35 which falls between small-size and large-size rms, and
both their equity and debt-to-equity ratios sit in the middle of these two sets of rms as well. To further
demonstrate the association between equity (debt-to-equity) ratio and fund ow decit level, we divide full
sample into two subsamples based on whether a rm faces fund ow decit or surplus situation. The results
reported in the last two rows of Table 1 support the earlier nding showing that the rm group with fund
ow surplus at $212.66 has a higher equity ratio and lower debt-to-equity ratio than the rm group with
fund ow decit at $172.69.
6The debt ratio is calculated as the % of total liability (which is the sum of both long-term and short-term liabilities) out of
total assets, i.e., the formula for the debt ratio is (total liability/total assets)100. Similarly, the formula for retained earning
ratio and equity ratio are (retained earnings/total assets)100 and (equity/total assets)100, respectively. We calculate the
debt-to-equity ratio by the formula of (total liability/equity).
7 It is, however, important to note that the debt ratio (unlike both the equity and debt-to-equity ratios) do not vary in a
specic direction with respect to either rm size or rm growth.
8A negative number for fund ow decit indicates the situation where sample rms end up with fund ow surplus.
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3 Empirical Methodology and Results
So far, evidence presented in Table 1 suggests rms increase the relative usage of debt to equity (to nance
their total assets) when the level of fund ow decit increases. It is, however, unclear as to whether this
increase in debt-to-equity ratio is the result of a rm changing its debt issue, equity issue, or both. The
rest of the paper focuses on examining what specic change in nancing choices contributes to the observed
positive relationship between fund ow decit and the debt-to-equity ratio.
3.1 Tests on the Pecking Orders Financing Hierarchy
An existing capital structure theory relevant to our study is the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984). The
theory argues that there is a cost of relying on external nancing driven by the asymmetric information
between managers and investors. This cost is referred to the situation where a rm passes up a valuable
investment opportunity because it has to issue undervalued securities to nance it. Since the debt issue is
generally involved with smaller undervalue problem than the equity issue, the theory suggests rm prefers
internal to external nancing, and debt to equity if it issues securities.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) note that the simplest form of the pecking order theory hypothesizes
that when a rms internal cash ows are inadequate for its real investment and dividend commitments (i.e.,
when a rm has fund ow decit), the rm issues debt but never equity.9 Consequently, the theory predicts
that the nancial decit should have a dollar-to-dollar impact on rm leverage:
4Dit = a1 + bpoDEFit + eit; (1)
where Dit is the long-term debt outstanding for rm i at period t; 4Dit ( = Dit  Dit 1) is the amount of
long-term debt issued by rm i at period t; and DEFit is the fund ow decit for rm i at period t.10 bpo
is the pecking order coe¢ cient and the supportive evidence for the theory is bpo = 1.
It is important to note that the standard pecking order regression (1) assumes that rm reaction of
changing debt issues to fund ow decit (DEFit > 0) and surplus (DEFit < 0) is "symmetric": rms would
issue (retire) debts when they have fund ow decit (surplus). Since the evidence in Table 1 seems to suggest
capital nancing choices are di¤erent between the rm group with fund ow decit and that with surplus,
in the subsequent analysis we will partition the standard pecking order regression (1) into cases with fund
ow decit situation and with fund ow surplus situation:
4Dit = a2 + bDpo  d1itDEFit + bSpo  d2itDEFit + "it; subject to (2)
d1it = 1; if DEFit > 0; otherwise d1it = 0
d2it = 1; if DEFit  0; otherwise d2it = 0
We refer regression (2) as the modied pecking order regression and the coe¢ cients of bDpo and b
S
po are
the modied pecking order coe¢ cient under fund ow decit and surplus, respectively. Although it has been
standard in the pecking order literature to use the data of long-term debt issued for the dependent variable
of 4Dit, here we use three di¤erent sets of data for it: 1. change in total liability 2. change in long-term
liability and 3. change in short-term liability. This approach is in response to some practitioners have noted
that a considerable portion of Chinese companiesdebt nancing is short-term.
Table 2 reports panel regression results on both standard and modied pecking order regressions (1) and
(2) for the full sample. Results on the standard pecking order regression (1) reveal that Chinese companies did
substantially rely on short-term debts as much as long-term debts. This can been seen from the compatible
size of estimated bPO between using 4Dit = 4 long-term liability and 4Dit = 4 short-term liability as
dependent variable for regression (1) (0:42 versus 0:38). Since the long-term and short-term liability are
9The equity issue may occur when a rm can only issue junk debt and its costs of nancial distress have been uncomfortably
high.
10The formula for fund ow decit is as follows: DEFt = dividend payment for period t + capital expenditure for period t
+ net increase in working capital for period t + current portion of long-term debt at start of period t   operating cash ows
(after interest and taxes) for period t.
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equally important to capture debt nancing behavior of Chinese rms, in the following analysis we use total
debt issued for 4Dit. When total debt issued is used for 4Dit, the standard pecking order coe¢ cient of bpo
is 0:79 (6= 1). This result indicates that there is not a full support for the pecking order theory in the full
sample. In addition, results on the modied pecking order regression (2) give rise to the asymmetric reaction
of debt issues to fund ow decit and surplus situation. The regression result of bDpo = 1:12 (insignicantly
di¤erent from 1) suggests that rms choose to entirely nance their decits by issuing debts when there is
fund ow decit situation. On the contrast, when there is fund ow surplus situation, the regression result
of bSpo being insignicantly di¤erent from 0 indicating that rms do not choose to retire any of their debt.
This asymmetricdebt nancing behavior in responding to fund ow decit and surplus situation is not
expected by the pecking order theory.
Does this asymmetric debt nancing behavior hold for di¤erent subsamples? We run panel regression
analysis on (1) and (2) for subsamples grouped by rm size, rm growth, and rm leverage. Panels A, B,
and C in Table 3 report associated regression results.
First, focusing on the standard pecking order regression (1), there appears considerable di¤erence in the
magnitude of estimated bpo among di¤erent rm-size, rm-growth, and rm-leverage groups. This result
indicates that rm size, rm growth, and rm leverage are inuential factors for debt nancing decisions.
For subsamples grouped by rm size, rm growth, and rm leverages, we nd the largest estimated bpo
is in the group of large-sized rms at 0:81, the high-growth rms at 1:02, and the low-leveraged rm at
1:22. These results are fairly consistent with what have been reported in the pecking order literature (see
Frank and Goyal (2003)). In more detail, similar to previous studies that often argue there is very little
support for the pecking order theory in small-size rms, we nd bpo = 0 for the group of small-sized Chinese
rms. In addition, capital structure studies (not limited to the pecking order studies) suggest that rms
are expected to have "reverting" nancing behavior towards moderate debt levels.11 The results in panel
C provide support for this noted reverting behavior showing that the low-leveraged rm group (who has
previous low level of leverage ) has the highest estimated bpo = 1:22, while the high-leveraged rm group
(who has previous high level of leverage) has the lowest estimated bpo = 0:72.
To assess whether there is an asymmetric debt nancing pattern cross di¤erent subsamples, we compare
the magnitude of estimated coe¢ cients between bDpo and b
S
po from the modied pecking order regression (2)
in each subsample. For three subsamples - large-sized rms, high-growth rms, low-leveraged rms, where
the largest estimated bpo is found in (1), their corresponding estimation results from regression (2) on bDpo
and bSpo are 1:14 and 0, 1:13 and 0:46, and 1:35 and 0, respectively. These results indicate a clear pattern of
bDpo > b
S
po, suggesting rms issue more debts under fund ow decit than retire debts under fund ow surplus.
This asymmetric debt nancing behavior is particularly striking in that for any subsample where signicant
positive bpo is found in (1), we see clearly that bDpo > b
S
po in (2) (except for the subsample of low-growth
rms).
3.2 Examination on A Hierarchy of Financing Sources
With the results indicating that bpo 6= 1 and the existence of asymmetric debt nancing behavior, the
evidence presented so far does not o¤er much support for the simplest version of pecking order theory which
suggests rms prefer to issue debt but never equity if fund ow decit situation arises. This result follows
that the pecking order regressions (1) and (2), where debt is considered the exclusive nancing source, are
insu¢ cient to capture Chinese rms capital nancing behavior. In order to fully investigate the issue as to
whether Chinese rms adhere to a hierarchy of nancing sources, we assess how Chinese rms allocate three
major nancing sources - retained earnings, debt, and equity, to fulll their funding requirement measured
by asset growth. To do so, we use the following regression:
4TAi;t
TAi;t 1
= a3 + bRE(
4REi;t
TAi;t 1
) + bDI(
4Di;t
TAi;t 1
) + bEI(
4Ei;t
TAi;t 1
) + it; (3)
11This reverting capital nancing behavior is expected regardless of whether a rm follows the trade-o¤ or pecking order
theory for its capital nancing decisions. For example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999, p. 226) note that they do not believe
that balance sheets are irrelevant and they expect rms to nd ways to add equity when debt ratios are painfully high, and to
reduce equity when they are near zero.
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where 4TAit ( = TAit   TAit 1) is the change in (the book value of) total assets for rm i at period t
(measured as the di¤erence in total assets from period t  1 to period t) ; 4REit ( = REit  REit 1) is the
amount retained earnings for rm i at period t; 4Dit ( = Dit  Dit 1) is the amount debt issued by rm i
at period t; and 4Eit (= Eit  Eit 1) is the amount equity issued by rm i at period t. To have total asset
change (4TAit ) expressed as the growth rate format in (3), explanatory variables of 4REit, 4Dit, and
4Eit are all measured in relation to the level of total asset at period t  1 (i.e., TAi;t 1). With this setting,
the estimated coe¢ cients of bRE , bDI , and bEI provide information on the portion of the funding requirement
(in total asset growth) that is nanced by retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue, respectively. If
bRE = bDI = bEI , it indicates that the change in funding requirement is exactly matched proportionately
by retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue.
Regression (3) was used in Watson and Wilson (2002) to examine how companies in the United Kingdom
nance their asset growth and we will refer it as the standard asset growth regression. Since our analysis in
the previous section has indicated an asymmetric rm nancing behavior in reaction to di¤erent fund ow
situations, in the following analysis we will further run our data on a modied asset growth regression where
we partition the standard asset growth regression (3) into cases with fund ow decit and with fund ow
surplus:
4TAi;t
TAi;t 1
= a4 + b
D
RE  d1it(
4REi;t
TAi;t 1
) + bDDI  d1it(
4Di;t
TAi;t 1
) + bDEI  d1it(
4Ei;t
TAi;t 1
) (4)
+bSRE  d2it(
4REi;t
TAi;t 1
) + bSDI  d2it(
4Di;t
TAi;t 1
) + bSEI  d2it(
4Ei;t
TAi;t 1
) + it, subject to
d1it = 1; if DEFit 1 > 0; otherwise d1it = 0
d2it = 1; if DEFit 1  0; otherwise d2it = 0
We refer regression (4) as the modied asset growth regression. In regression (4), the ranking on the size
of estimated coe¢ cients among bDRE , b
D
DI , and b
D
EI (b
S
RE , b
S
DI , and b
S
EI) provides direct reference on what a
hierarchy of nancing sources among retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue is for Chinese rms when
they face fund ow decits (surplus). Comparison on the two rankings generated from regression (4) would
give inference on whether fund ow condition a¤ects nancing preference of Chinese rms. Further, the
ranking on the size of coe¢ cients from both regressions (3) and (4) would reveal whether the pecking order
theory holds in Chinese rms. The supportive evidence for the pecking order theory are bRE > bDI > bEI
from (3) and bDRE > b
D
DI > b
D
EI from (4).
3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Prior to the regression analysis, Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for % changes in total assets, and
in nancing sources (including retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue) for the full sample and the
subsamples. To facilitate the examination on a potential relation between the fund ow condition and the
relative changes in three nancing sources among di¤erent rm groups, the last column of Table 4 compiles
the data of fund ow decit.
The results for the full sample show that Chinese companies, as a whole, have a mean of annual total
asset growth rate of 14:66% (See results in [.]). To make fair comparison on the size of % change in retained
earnings, debt issue, and equity issue in di¤erent subsamples, we scale % changes in these three nancing
sources by % change in total assets. With this scaling, the results for the full sample shows that corresponding
to 1% growth in total assets, the debt issue has the highest increment at the average of 0:67%, followed by
the equity issue of 0:15%, and the retained earnings of 0:02%.
The results for the subsample grouped by rm size indicates that both % changes in debt and equity
vary negatively with respect to rm size: The small-sized rms have a highest % changes in debt and equity
of 0:77% and 0:26%, respectively, followed by the medium-sized rms at 0:67% and 0:15%, respectively, and
the large-sized rms at 0:63% and 0:10%, respectively. Similar to the nding for rm size, the results for
the subsample grouped by rm growth show that both % changes in debt and equity vary negatively with
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respect to rm growth. For the subsamples grouped by the level of rm leverage, the results show that the
level of leverage is positive associated with % change in debt but negative associated with % change in equity.
These results from subsamples suggest the level of rm size, rm growth, and rm leverage are important
factors for the observed variation in change in nancing sources.
For this papers particular interest, the most important observation from Table 4 is that there are con-
sistent results suggesting a pattern that the rm group with smaller fund ow decit level tends to end up
with larger change in both debt and equity. The results in the last two rows of Table 4 support the pattern
showing that when the full sample is divided into two subsamples based on the fund ow condition, the rm
group with fund ow surplus at $212:66 has a larger % change in both debt and equity of 0:90% and 0:22%,
respectively, than the rm group with fund ow decit at $172:69 of 0:62% and 0:13%, respectively. This
negative relation between the level of fund ow decit and % change in both debt and equity can also be
seen in subsamples grouped by both rm size and rm growth. For example, the large-sized rms have the
largest fund ow decit at $35.58, followed by medium-sized rm at $23.35, and small-sized rm at -$5.35.
Their associated % changes in debt and equity have the smallest level at 0:63% and 0:10%, respectively,
for large-sized rms, followed by 0:67% and 0:15%, respectively, for medium-size rms, and by 0:77% and
0:26%, respectively, for small-sized rms.
Overall, results in Table 4 suggest that in addition to the level of rm size, rm growth, and rm
leverage, rms fund ow condition appears to be a key determinant for its decision on the relative usage of
nancing sources for the funding of rm growth. In particular, the result of negative association between
the level of fund ow decit and the changes in both debt and equity suggests that rms with less fund ow
decit tend to utilize not only more of debt issues but also more of equity issues to fulll their nancing
requirement. Since both debt and equity issues react to the level of fund ow decit in the same direction,
what remains unclear is whether rm prefers debt issues over equity issues (or equity issues over debt issues)
for its funding requirement with respect to di¤erent fund ow situation. To identify the hierarchy on rms
nancing sources, we next turn our attention to the regression analysis of (3) and (4). Table 5 and Table 6
report associated regression results for the full sample and subsamples, respectively.
3.2.2 Asymmetric Behavior on the Preference towards Equity Financing
For the full sample, the coe¢ cient estimation from the standard asset growth regression (3) are bRE = 0:80,
bDI = 0:87, and bEI = 1:72. This result indicates that Chinese companies, as a whole, use equity issues
most extensively to nance rm growth. The preference of equity issues over both retained earnings and
debt issues are clearly indicated by the fact that the size of bEI is approximately twice as large as both bRE ,
and bDI .
What condition may contribute to this observed rm behavior of preferring equity issues for rm growth?
Our further analysis from the modied asset growth regression (4) shows that the condition of whether a
rm experiences fund ow surplus matters to this particular nancing behavior. Specically, focusing on
the result for the cases with fund ow surplus, we nd that equity issues are overwhelmingly preferred over
both retained earnings and debt issues (bSRE = 0:74, b
S
DI = 0:67, and b
S
EI = 3:09). In the contrast, for the
cases with fund ow decit, we see that rms do not necessarily prefer equity over debt nancing. Firms
appear to fund their growth proportionately by equity and debt issues and this nding is evidenced by the
compatible size of estimated coe¢ cients on bDDI and b
D
EI (b
D
DI = 1:15, and b
D
EI = 1:24 ).
A clear indication from the results in Table 5 is that Chinese companies, as a whole, do not follow the
pecking order theory to exhibit the nancing behavior of bRE > bDI > bEI . Instead, their nancing behavior
exhibits a clear tendency of bEI > bDI . Further, such tendency of preferring equity over debt nancing
intensies with the condition of fund ow surplus but subsides with the condition of fund ow decit.
Regression results for subsamples reported in Table 6 further conrms the pattern that Chinese rms
prefer to issue equity over debts for rm growth. We see this pattern arises when making comparison on the
size of estimated coe¢ cients between bDI and bEI in regression (3) for all subsamples. We note that in all
nine subsamples (with an only exception of low-growth rms subsample), the estimated coe¢ cients showing
a pattern of bEI > bDI . Also, we see the extent on the pattern of bEI > bDI varies among subsamples. In
more details, the pattern of bEI > bDI is most pronounced in the group of small-size rms (bEI = 1:21, and
8
bDI = 0:38) , high-growth rms (bEI = 2:16, and bDI = 0:90), and high-leverage rms (bEI = 2:67, and
bDI = 0:67) among subsamples grouped by rm size, rm growth, and rm leverage, respectively. We regard
this result as the evidence that rm characteristic a¤ects the degree of rms nancing preference on equity
over debt issues. The characteristic of a rm group is generally plausible for its nancing hierarchy estimated
by regression (3). For example, among all subsamples, the high-leverage rm group has the strongest pattern
of bEI > bDI showing that funding requirement for rm growth is nanced at a 4 : 1 ratio between equity
issues and debt issues. This result is plausible based on the fact that high-leverage rms may have painfully
high debt ratios, thus they prefer to add much of equity but little debt for their nancial need.
Most importantly, in all eight (out of nine) subsamples where the pattern of bEI > bDI is identied in the
standard asset growth regression (3), their corresponding results from the modied asset growth regression
(4) reveal a stylized "asymmetric" capital nancing behavior. The rm attitude of favoring equity over debt
nancing is asymmetric to its fund ow condition: The pattern of bEI > bDI is much stronger when there is
fund ow surplus than there is fund ow decit. We use the regression results for the group of small-size rms
to demonstrate the noted asymmetric nancing behavior. For small-size rms, estimates from regression (3)
(which does not consider the rms fund ow condition) identies the nancing hierarchy as equity issue
rst, then retained earnings, and the last debt issues (i.e., bEI > bRE > bDI). With the fund ow condition
being added to the consideration, estimates from regression (4) show that cases with fund ow surplus end
up with the same nancing hierarchy of bSEI > b
S
RE > b
S
DI as regression (3) has identied, but cases with fund
ow decit do not. Although estimates from both regression (3) and regression (4) with cases of fund ow
surplus indicate the same nancing hierarchy, rms preference on equity over debt issues are much stronger
in regression (4) with cases of fund ow surplus than in regression (3) (bSEI = 1:74, b
S
DI = 0 versus bEI = 1:21,
bDI = 0:38). On the contrary, such preference toward equity issues diminishes considerably when fund ow
decit situation is present. The evidence for this result comes from the estimates from regression (4) with
cases of fund ow decit being bDEI = 0:92 and b
D
DI = 0:98, which are not statistically being di¤erent. In this
particular subsample of small-size rms, fund ow decit situation reduces rms overall nance preference
on equity issues to a level where the rm growth is funded by approximately equal proportions of debt and
equity issues.
All in all, results in Table 6 provide a clear picture on the capital nancing choices among Chinese rms
towards funding rm growth. The evidence suggests that the fund ow condition does have critical impact
on rms capital nancing choices. With fund ow surplus, rms choose to issue a lot more equity than debt
to nance their growth. The considerable extent on the pattern of bSEI > b
S
DI can be seen in each of the eight
subsample where bEI > bDI is identied. With fund ow decit, rms preference on equity issue diminishes
substantially. In six (out of eight) subsamples, this preference diminishes to a level where rm chooses to
nance growth by similar amount of debt and equity issues (i.e., bDEI = b
D
DI). These six subsamples are
small-size rms, medium-size rms, medium-growth rms, low-leverage rms, medium-leverage rms, and
high-leverage rms. Firms in the other two subsamples, large-size rms and high-growth rms, remain to
have equity issues as the dominating nance source for rm growth.
The asymmetric capital nancing behavior in reaction to fund ow condition is apparent when the
estimates from regression (4) under cases of fund ow surplus and cases of fund ow decit are compared.
For example, in the subsample of high-growth rms, the estimates of bEI and bDI di¤er at a much larger
extent under fund ow surplus than under fund ow decit (bSEI = 2:80, b
S
DI = 0:83 versus b
D
EI = 1:63,
bDDI = 1:26). Consequently, we note that it is rms strong preference on equity nancing under fund ow
surplus (but not decit) situation contributes to the overall nancing hierarchy of bEI > bDI . Another point
to make is the capital nancing behavior among Chinese rms shows a complete deviation from what the
pecking order theory would have expected. In all subsamples (except low-growth rms), we see no result
indicating that rm used either more of debt issue or retained earnings (i.e., internal funding) than equity
issue to nance their growth regardless of the fund ow condition.
4 Discussion
We have identied two types of asymmetry in Chinese rms capital nancing behavior in reaction to fund
ow condition. The rst type of asymmetric behavior shows that rms issue more debts under fund ow
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decit than retire debts under fund ow surplus. More specically, our analysis from the modied pecking
order regression (2) indicates that rms choose to entirely nance their decits by issuing debts when there
is fund ow decit but retire very little debt when there is fund ow surplus. The second type of asymmetric
behavior is the rm attitude of favoring equity over debt nancing (for rm growth) is much stronger under
fund ow surplus than under fund ow decit. More specically, our analysis from the modied asset growth
regression (4) reveals that rm choose to issue overwhelmingly more equity than debt under fund ow surplus
but issue similar amount of equity and debt under fund ow decit.
The two noted asymmetric nancing behavior are found to exist in all of the subsamples (except low-
growth rms) grouped by three di¤erent rm characteristics, including rm size, rm growth, and rm
leverage. We therefore argue that the stylized asymmetric nancing behavior is independent from the rm
characteristics and Chinese rms fairly homogenous reactions in nancing choices to fund ow condition
contribute to the asymmetric nancing patterns observed in the full sample. In addition to the asymmetric
capital nancing behavior to fund ow condition, the evidence also indicates a universalattitude of favoring
equity nancing over both debt and internal nancing, which is found to exist across di¤erent rm groups
with di¤erent rm characteristics.
What role does the rm characteristic and the fund ow condition each play in the Chinese rms capital
nancing choices? In the literature, rm characteristics are typically found to be useful in explaining the
observed variations on the relative usage of major nancing sources among di¤erent rm groups. Consistent
with the literature, in this paper we nd that the rm characteristics can help explain the variations in the
degree of Chinese rms universal capital nancing preference towards equity issues. For example, the
evidence indicates that both the high-leverage and the low-leverage rm groups choose to use equity as the
priority nancing source, but this attitude of favoring equity nancing is much stronger in the high-leverage
rm group than in the low-leverage rm group. This result is readily plausible in that the high-leverage rms
are more likely to have uncomfortably high debt ratio and consequently they tend to use equity nancing
more extensively than the low-leverage rms. Following this rationale, rm characteristics are presumably
the rst set of factors for Chinese rms to decide on their capital nancing choices. Depending on its status
on the rm size, rm growth, and rm leverage, the rm decides on what degree of preference on equity
nancing (relative to debt and internal nancing) is appropriate to pursue. Accordingly, the rm forms its
baseline attitude on the capital nancing choices based upon the rm characteristics. Yet, the rm would
have to adjust its baseline nancing choices from time to time according to the changing fund ow condition
it faces. The reason for this adjustment is that the change in fund ow condition can critically inuence the
rms ability in pursuing the preference on equity issues.
In general, the rms decision on the extent of new equity issues depends on the potential price it can
receive from investors. In pricing the rms new stock issues, investors rely on any information that helps
to form their expectation about the rms future prospects. We argue that the rms fund ow condition
is informative about the rms future prospects: The investors view the fund ow surplus as positive news
to the rms future prospects, while the fund ow decit as negative news. As a result, the rm expects to
receive better price for its new equity issues when facing the fund ow surplus than the fund ow decit.
Given that Chinese rms have a universal preference towards equity issues, their nancing choice for
funding requirement would always be equity issues rst. Debt issues would not be considered unless the
equity nancing is practically infeasible (or insu¢ cient) to meet the funding requirement. In other words,
the rms decision on the extent of debt issues is contingent to how much it can pursue the preference of
equity issues. When the rm faces fund ow decit, its ability to pursue preference on equity nancing
subsides given that it is likely to receive unfavorable (or bad) price for the new stock issues. This situation
leads to the observation that both equity and debt issues are used to a similar extent to fund rm growth as
the rm downplays the attitude of favoring equity issues under fund ow decit. To the contrary, when the
rm faces fund ow surplus, expectation on the favorable price to be received on new stock shares issued
allows the rm to fully pursue the preference on equity nancing. This situation explains why we observe
overwhelmingly larger extent in equity issues than debt issues for funding requirement under the fund ow
surplus. It evidences that Chinese rms prefer equity nancing and the situation of fund ow surplus further
facilitates this preference.
In summary, the evidence indicates that Chinese rms have exhibited the universal preference to nance
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rm growth by issuing equity over debt, regardless of whether there is di¤erence in the rm characteristics.
Further, the fund ow condition is a deciding factor for the rm to change this universal preference on equity
nancing either to a larger extent if under fund ow surplus or to a smaller extent if under fund ow decit.
Finally, we can use this stylized asymmetric capital nancing behavior to explain what specic rm action
contributes to the observation that the rm group with higher fund ow decit ends up with higher debt-to-
equity ratio (associated statistics are presented in Table 1). As discussed earlier, the increase in fund ow
decit limits the rms ability to pursue the preference on equity nancing. Consequently, the worsening
fund ow condition forces the rm to issue fewer equity, which makes equity issue along is insu¢ cient to
full the funding requirement. This situation in turn forces the rm to issue more debt. It is therefore clear
that the increase in debt-to-equity ratio is the result of the rm changing both its debt and equity issues to
react to the increase in fund ow decit.
A relevant point to make is the Chinese rms nancing behavior on the amount of debt issues deviates
completely from what is predicted by the pecking order theory. The pecking order theory predicts that
there is a dollar-to-dollar direct impact from the nancial decit to the debt issue. Deviating from this
prediction, the Chinese rms nancing behavior shows that the fund ow condition only has direct impact
on the amount of equity issue. It is this direct impact on the amount of equity issue "indirectly" a¤ects the
amount of debt issue.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the nancing behavior of Chinese companies using data from 1,217 publicly
traded companies listed in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges covering the period of 1994
to 2006. The evidence indicates that the capital nancing behavior of Chinese rms deviates substantially
from the well-known pecking order theory which predicts the rm prefers to issue debt but never equity if
the fund ow decit situation arises and the rm prefers internal to external nancing, and debt to equity
if it issues securities.
Starting with the analysis on the standard pecking order regression, we nd that there is little support
for a dollar-to-dollar impact from fund ow decit to debt issue. This result gives indication that besides
debt, other nance sources are used by the Chinese rms to meet their funding requirement when facing fund
ow decit and that the pecking order theory is insu¢ cient to capture the Chinese rms capital nancing
behavior. To investigate whether the Chinese rms adhere to a hierarchy of nancing sources, including
retained earnings, debt issue, and equity issue, to meet their funding requirement, we next run analysis on
the asset growth regression that gives estimates on the portion of the asset growth that is nanced by each of
the three nancing sources. The results show that equity issues are always the preferred nancing source over
both retained earnings, and debt issues, for funding requirement. It is important to note that the attitude
of favoring equity issues emerges as the universalphenomena among Chinese rms, regardless of whether
there is di¤erence in their rm characteristics. Further evidence shows that although the rm characteristics
and the fund ow condition are both important for the decision on the relative usage of nancing sources,
ultimately Chinese rms use the fund ow condition as the deciding factor for their capital nancing choices.
The condition of whether the rm experiences fund ow decit or surplus a¤ects rms decision on how much
it can pursue the noted universal preference on equity issues.
The important role of fund ow condition in capital nancing choices resides upon its potential inuence
on the price that is expected to be received on the new stock shares issued. The occurrence of fund ow decit
gives investors negative view on the rms future prospects, which in turn lowers the rms expectation on the
price for the new stocks issued. Accordingly, the fund ow decit limits the rms ability to pursue its given
nancing preference on equity issues. We thus observe that both debt and equity issues are used to a similar
extent to nance rm growth when there exists fund ow decit. On the other hand, the investors welcome
the occurrence of fund ow surplus and regard it as good news for the rms future prospects. Expecting
good price to be received on the new stock shares, the rm fully peruses its given nancing preference on
equity issues. We thus observe that the equity are issued way more extensively than the debt to nance rm
growth when there exists fund ow surplus.
In conclusion, evidence presented in this paper suggests that Chinese rms have acted on their preference
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towards equity nancing regardless of whether there is fund ow decit or surplus situation. The observed
asymmetric capital nancing pattern much more equity issues are used over debt issues under fund ow
surplus than under fund ow decit, is the result of Chinese rms selecting the degree of inherent equity-issue
preference that is feasible to pursue based on its fund ow condition.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Capital Structures in Full Sample and Subsamples  
  Mean of  Grouping Criteria for Subsamples  Mean of Capital Structure Variables  
 No. of 
Firms 
Total  
Assets 
Total Asset  
Growth (%) 
Debt 
Ratio (%) 
Retained Earning 
Ratio (%) 
Equity  
Ratio (%) 
Debt-to-Equity 
Ratio 
Fund Flow 
Deficit 
Full Sample 1,217 $2,943.68 14.66 50.89 -4.62 22.01 3.25 $17.85 
 
Subsamples grouped by  
firm size: 
        
    Small-size Firms 406 $638.59 8.34 53.14 -17.62 30.10 2.17 -$5.35 
    Medium-size Firms 405 $1,380.29 14.72 48.53 -0.15 19.90 3.05 $23.35 
    Large-size Firms 406 $6,808.31 20.92 50.99 3.94 16.03 4.52 $35.58 
 
Subsamples grouped by  
firm growth: 
        
   Low-growth Firms 406 $1,851.03 1.01 55.24 -19.54 28.13 2.46 -$124.28 
   Medium-growth Firms 405 $3,370.51 12.94 47.05 1.57 20.59 2.92 -$62.72 
   High-growth Firms 406 $3,610.55 30.04 50.37 4.14 17.32 4.37 $240.36 
 
Subsamples grouped by  
firm leverage: 
        
   Low-leverage Firms 406 $2,170.37 12.71 29.68 6.37 24.61 1.56 $49.62 
   Medium-leverage Firms 405 $3,994.45 16.82 47.79 2.82 19.78 3.06 -$70.86 
   High-leverage Firms 405 $2,668.81 14.46 75.19 -23.03 21.65 5.13 $74.58 
 
Subsample grouped by 
fund flow condition:         
    with Fund Flow Deficit 728 $2,706.86 20.13 46.40 4.26 19.10 3.45 $172.69 
with Fund Flow Surplus 489 $3,296.25 6.52 57.58 -17.83 26.35 2.96 -$212.66 
Notes: Total Assets and Fund Flow Deficit are expressed in terms of millions Chinese yuan. See footnote 6 for the exact definitions of retained ratio, 
equity ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio. Also see footnote 10 for the definition of fund flow deficit. 
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Table 2: Full Sample of Fixed Effect Panel Regression on Equations (1) and (2): Estimated Coefficients and Test Statistics 
 Dependent Variable  
 
∆Dit = ∆ Total liability ∆Dit = ∆ Long-term liability ∆Dit = ∆ Short-term liability Coefficients of explanatory  
variables and test statistics (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Standard pecking order coefficient: 
POb  
 
0.79*** 
(5.65) 
 0.42*** 
(9.805) 
 0.38** 
(2.42) 
 
Modified pecking order coefficient:       
  with fund flow deficit: D
POb   1.12*** 
(8.48) 
 0.38*** 
(7.68) 
 0.75*** 
(4.91) 
  with fund flow surplus: S
POb   0.13 
(0.40) 
 
 0.50*** 
(7.41) 
 -0.37 
(-1.25) 
R2 
 
0.41 0.49 0.58 0.59 0.15 0.32 
No. of firms 
 
1,217 
No. of observations 
 
9,354 
No. of observations with fund flow deficit 
 
5,011 
No. of observations with fund flow surplus 
 
4,343 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, and ** 1%, and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Subsamples of Fixed Effect Panel Regression on Equations (1) and (2): Estimated Coefficients and Test 
Statistics 
 
 
Panel A: Subsamples grouped by firm size: 
 
 Small-sized firms Medium-sized firms Large-sized firms 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Standard pecking order coefficient: 
POb  0.06 
(1.55) 
 0.24*** 
(4.72) 
 0.81*** 
(5.66) 
 
Modified pecking order coefficient:       
  with fund flow deficit: D
POb   0.12 
(1.34) 
 0.44*** 
  (5.66) 
 1.14*** 
(8.49) 
  with fund flow surplus: S
POb   0.02 
(0.37) 
 -0.01 
(-0.11) 
 0.15 
(0.43) 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.43 0.51 
No. of firms 406 406 405 405 406 406 
No. of observations 3115 3115   3028   3028 3211 3211 
No. of observations with fund flow deficit  1551  1669  1790 
No. of observations with fund flow surplus  1564  1359  1421 
 
Panel B: Subsamples grouped by firm growth: 
 
 Low-growth firms Medium-growth firms High-growth firms 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Standard pecking order coefficient: 
POb  0.23*** 
(4.96) 
 0.21 
(0.52) 
 1.02*** 
(9.64) 
 
Modified pecking order coefficient:       
  with fund flow deficit: D
POb   0.07 
(0.61) 
 0.76**** 
(2.72) 
 1.13*** 
(7.58) 
  with fund flow surplus: S
POb   0.27*** 
(5.32) 
 0.01 
(0.02) 
 0.46* 
(1.85) 
R2 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.68 0.69 
No. of firms 406 406 405 405 406 406 
No. of observations 3195 3195 3264 3264 2895 2895 
No. of observations with fund flow deficit  1367  1773  1870 
No. of observations with fund flow surplus  1828  1491  1025 
 
Panel C: Subsamples grouped by firm leverage: 
 
 Low-leverage firms Medium-leverage firms High-leverage firms 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Standard pecking order coefficient: 
POb  1.22*** 
(5.59) 
 0.62*** 
(2.84) 
 0.72*** 
(9.63) 
 
Modified pecking order coefficient:       
With fund flow deficit: D
POb   1.35*** 
(6.03) 
 1.07*** 
(5.85) 
 0.85*** 
(13.09) 
With fund flow surplus: S
POb   0.02 
(0.o8) 
 0.11 
(0.25) 
 0.39** 
(2.33) 
R2 0.73 0.77 0.27 0.36 0.40 0.42 
No. of firms 406 406 405 405 406 406 
No. of observations 2940 2940 3163 3163 3251 3251 
No. of observations with fund flow deficit  1571  1745  1694 
No. of observations with fund flow surplus  1369  1418  1557 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Changes in Total Assets and in Three Major Financing Sources in Full Sample and Subsamples  
 
  % Change in Total Assets % Change in Financing Sources Fund Flow Deficit 
 No. of  
Firms 
 
∆TAt/TAt-1 
Retained Earnings:  
∆REt/TAt-1 
Debt Issue: 
∆Dt/TAt-1 
Equity Issue: 
∆Et/TAt-1 
 
DEFt 
Full Sample 
 
1217 1.00 [14.66] 0.02 [0.22] 0.67 [9.86] 0.15 [2.16] 17.85 
Subsamples grouped by  
firm size: 
      
    Small-size Firms 406 1.00 [8.34] -0.16 [-1.31] 0.77 [6.46] 0.26 [2.20] -5.35 
    Medium-size Firms 405 1.00 [14.72] 0.03 [0.44] 0.67 [9.89] 0.15 [2.20] 23.35 
Large-size Firms 
 
406 1.00 [20.92] 0.07 [1.55] 0.63 [13.24] 0.10 [2.09] 35.58 
Subsamples grouped by  
firm growth: 
      
   Low-growth Firms 406 1.00 [1.01] -2.09 [-2.11] 2.08 [2.10] 1.29 [1.30] -124.28 
   Medium-growth Firms 405 1.00 [12.94] 0.05 [0.63] 0.62 [7.96] 0.16 [2.05] -63.89 
   High-growth Firms 
 
406 1.00 [30.04] 0.07 [2.15] 0.65 [19.52] 0.10 [3.14] 240.36 
Subsamples grouped by  
firm leverage: 
      
   Low-leverage Firms 406 1.00 [12.71] 0.12 [1.57] 0.46 [5.83] 0.20 [2.57] 49.62 
   Medium-leverage Firms 405 1.00 [16.82] 0.05 [0.86] 0.66 [11.14] 0.13 [2.24] -70.86 
   High-leverage Firms 
 
406 1.00 [14.46] -0.12 [-1.74] 0.87 [12.61] 0.12 [1.68] 74.58 
Subsample grouped by 
fund flow condition: 
      
    with Fund Flow Deficit 728 1.00 [20.13] 0.07 [1.39] 0.62 [12.55] 0.13 [2.65] 172.69 
with Fund Flow Surplus 489 1.00 [6.52] -0.23 [-1.51] 0.90 [5.86] 0.22 [1.44] -212.66 
Notes: Fund flow deficit are expressed in terms of millions Chinese yuan. 
For ease in comparison, we scale statistics of % change in total assets, % change in retained earnings, % change in debt issue, and % change in 
equity issue by % change in total assets. The initial statistics of these variables without such scaling are reported in [.].    
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Table 5: Full Sample of Fixed Effect Panel Regression on Equations (3) and (4): Estimated 
Coefficients and Test Statistics 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆TAi,t/TAi, t−1 Coefficients of explanatory variables and test statistics 
(3) (4) 
 
Standard TA growth regression coefficients:   
REb
 0.80*** 
(4.76) 
 
DIb
 0.87*** 
(5.20) 
 
EIb
 1.72*** 
(6.54) 
 
 
Modified TA growth regression coefficients:   
  with fund flow deficit:    
D
REb   0.77*** (7.91) 
D
DIb   1.15*** (17.20) 
D
EIb   1.24*** (8.98) 
  with fund flow surplus:    
S
REb   0.74*** (3.33) 
S
DIb   0.67*** (3.02) 
S
EIb   3.09*** (3.95) 
 
R2 0.66 0.70 
 
No. of firms 1204 1204 
 
No. of observations 8137 8137 
 
No. of observations with fund flow deficit  4502 
 
No. of observations with fund flow surplus  3635 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses.  *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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Table 6: Subsamples of Fixed Effect Panel Regression on Equations (3) and (4): Estimated Coefficients and Test 
Statistics 
 
 
Panel A: Subsamples grouped by firm size: 
 
 Small-sized firms Medium-sized firms Large-sized firms 
 (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) 
 
Standard TA growth regression coefficients:       
REb
 0.66*** 
(4.44) 
 0.82*** 
(5.21) 
 1.09*** 
(15.60) 
 
DIb
 0.38* 
(1.80) 
 1.19*** 
(21.42) 
 1.19*** 
(15.47) 
 
EIb
 1.21*** 
(6.58  ) 
 1.36*** 
(4.62) 
 1.66*** 
(9.93) 
 
Modified TA growth regression coefficients:       
  with fund flow deficit:       
D
REb   0.61*** (7.59)   
 1.01*** 
(15.03) 
 1.13*** 
(8.95) 
D
DIb   0.98*** (20.35) 
 1.19*** 
(16.43) 
 1.27*** 
(10.46) 
D
EIb   0.92*** (6.29) 
 1.03*** 
(3.89) 
 1.54*** 
(8.14) 
  with fund flow surplus:        
S
REb   0.52*** (3.10) 
 0.59*** 
(2.65) 
 1.04*** 
(16.85) 
S
DIb   0.17 (0.91) 
 1.16*** 
(23.14) 
 1.09*** 
(28.60) 
S
EIb   1.74*** (3.41) 
 2.34*** 
(5.37) 
 1.97*** 
(6.98) 
R2 0.34 0.47 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.88 
No. of firms 398 398 403 403 403 403 
No. of observations 2709 2709 2623 2623 2805 2805 
No. of observations with fund flow deficit  1392  1507  1603 
No. of observations with fund flow surplus  1317  1116  1202 
 
 
Panel B: Subsamples grouped by firm growth: 
 
 Low-growth firms Medium-growth firms High-growth firms 
 (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) 
 
Standard TA growth regression coefficients:       
REb
 0.64*** 
(9.52) 
 0.36 
(1.24) 
 1.98** 
(2.35) 
 
DIb
 0.83*** 
(14.88) 
 0.72*** 
(4.80) 
 0.90*** 
(4.96) 
 
EIb
 0.58*** 
(2.73) 
 1.49*** 
(7.22) 
 2.16*** 
(5.33) 
 
Modified TA growth regression coefficients:       
With fund flow deficit:        
D
REb   0.65*** (10.11) 
 0.96*** 
(5.51) 
 0.58* 
(1.93) 
D
DIb   0.87*** (17.13) 
 1.04*** 
(38.42) 
 1.26*** 
(14.50) 
D
EIb   0.51** (2.17) 
 1.02*** 
(9.67) 
 1.63*** 
(8.88) 
  with fund flow surplus:        
S
REb   0.63*** (6.22) 
 0.20 
(0.66) 
 2.88*** 
(3.71) 
S
DIb   0.80*** (9.75) 
 0.51*** 
(2.75) 
 0.83*** 
(5.50) 
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S
EIb   0.81*** (5.65) 
 2.51*** 
(4.83) 
 2.80*** 
(3.75) 
R2 0.66 0.66 0.52 0.59 0.76 0.81 
No. of firms 401 401 402 402 401 401 
No. of observations 2789 2789 2859 2859 2489 2489 
No. of observations with fund flow deficit  1244  1620  1638 
No. of observations with fund flow surplus  1545  1239  851 
 
 
Panel C: Subsamples grouped by firm leverage: 
 
 Low-leverage firms Medium-leverage firms High-leverage firms 
 (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) 
 
Standard TA growth regression coefficients:       
REb
 0.93*** 
(6.69) 
 0.98*** 
(12.77) 
 0.70*** 
(4.51) 
 
DIb
 1.14*** 
(23.30) 
 1.24*** 
(14.45) 
 0.67*** 
(3.09) 
 
EIb
 1.27*** 
(10.83) 
 1.39*** 
(9.95) 
 2.67** 
(2.56) 
 
Modified TA growth regression coefficients:       
With fund flow deficit:        
D
REb   0.96*** (4.55) 
 1.13*** 
(8.45) 
 0.70*** 
(8.93) 
D
DIb   1.17*** (16.47) 
 1.32*** 
(10.51) 
 1.02*** 
(24.60) 
D
EIb   1.27*** (9.28) 
 1.30*** 
(9.03) 
 0.93*** 
(2.83) 
  with fund flow surplus:        
S
REb   0.91*** (5.68) 
 0.84*** 
(11.02) 
 0.63*** 
(3.13) 
S
DIb   1.10*** (19.97) 
 1.12*** 
(39.16) 
 0.45* 
(1.90) 
S
EIb   1.26*** (4.91) 
 1.60*** 
(5.54) 
 6.74*** 
(3.47) 
R2 0.73 0.73 0.86 0.86 0.59 0.68 
No. of firms 400 400 399 399 405 405 
No. of observations 2534 2534 2758 2758 2845 2845 
No. of observations with fund flow deficit  1395  1580  1527 
No. of observations with fund flow surplus  1139  1178  1318 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
